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“JUST THE FACTS, MA’AM”:1
HOW MILITARY APPELLATE COURTS 
RELY ON FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY 
REVIEW TO OVERTURN SEXUAL 
ASSAULT CASES WHEN VICTIMS ARE 
“INCAPACITATED” 
Lisa M. Schenck
 “SW’s segmented memories lacked significant details and she could 
provide no chronology of the events she did remember. . . . we simply are 
not convinced that the Government satisfied its burden of proving the 
appellant’s guilt to the charges of rape and forcible sodomy beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We therefore find the appellant’s convictions factually 
insufficient.”2 
1. This phrase is attributed to Jack Webb, a character in the TV series, Dragnet, 1951—
1959 and 1967—1970.  See Dragnet, IMDB (TV Series 1951 – 1959), 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0043194 (last visited Feb. 2, 2016); Just the Facts Ma’am Idiom, 
FREE DICTIONARY, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/Just+the+facts,+Ma'am (last visited Feb. 
2, 2016); Franchise/Dragnet, TV TROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Franchise/ 
Dragnet (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Co-Director of the National Security Law LL.M. 
Program, Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School.  The 
author is a retired U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps colonel who served as an Associate 
and Senior Judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (2002–2008); upon retirement, she 
served as the Senior Adviser to the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services 
(2008–2009).  B.A., Providence College; M.P.A., Fairleigh Dickinson University; J.D., Notre 
Dame Law School; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School; LL.M., Yale 
Law School; J.S.D., Yale Law School.  This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and 
does not represent the views of the University, Law School, Department of Defense, or 
Department of the Army.  The author would like to thank Benjamin Christian, a dedicated 
research assistant, for his assistance and support.     
2. United States v. Clark, NMCCA 201400232, 2015 CCA LEXIS 287 (N.M. Ct. Crim.
App. July 14, 2015). 
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“[W]e are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
complainants were incapable of consenting—that is, that they lacked the 
cognitive ability to appreciate the sexual conduct in question or the 
physical or mental ability to make and to communicate a decision about 
whether they agreed to the conduct.”3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The quotes above reflect a military appellate court exercising its unique 
authority—based on factual sufficiency—to overturn the guilty findings of 
courts-martial. Other federal courts do not have this same responsibility or 
power. Service criminal courts of appeals have been entrusted with this 
authority pursuant to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ),4 an authority often characterized as an “awesome, plenary de novo 
power of review.”5  This judicial “de novo review” of the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence at trial involves evaluating the weight and 
sufficiency of the evidence.6 “Such a review involves a fresh, impartial look 
at the evidence, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court on 
factual sufficiency . . . .”7 In some cases, the courts of criminal appeals have 
determined that sex crime victims are not credible and have found this to be 
a pivotal factor when deciding to overturn a conviction.8  Military criminal 
 
3. United States v. Pease, 74 M.J. 763, 770 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J. 180 
(C.A.A.F. 2016). 
4. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) art. 66(c), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (West 1996) 
[hereinafter UCMJ].  
5. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 144 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations omitted). 
6. 10 U.S.C.A. § 866(c); see United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987).  
7. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002). 
8. See e.g., Pease, 74 M.J. at 763; United States v. Bridenstine, NMCCA 201500041, 2015 
CCA LEXIS 462 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2015); United States v. Clark, NMCCA 
201400232, 2015 CCA LEXIS 287 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2015); United States v. Collins, 
NMCCA 201000020, 2011 CCA LEXIS 22 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2011); United States 
v. Lamb, NMCCA 201000044, 2010 CCA LEXIS 334 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2010); 
United States v. Peterson, NMCCA 200900688, 2010 CCA LEXIS 336 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 
Sept. 21, 2010); United States v. Wood, NMCCA 200900436, 2010 CCA LEXIS 24 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2010); United States v. House, ACCA 20061064, 2009 CCA LEXIS 192 (A. 
Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2009); United States v. Foster, NMCCA 200101955, 2009 CCA LEXIS 
62 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2009); United States v. Parker, 54 M.J. 700 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
Jan. 12, 2001). Some cases have withstood challenge; United States v. Brown, ACCA 20130177, 
2014 WL 7237501, at *2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 
2015); United States v. Torres, NMCCA 201300396, 2014 CCA LEXIS 641 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Aug. 28, 2014); United States v. Redmon, NMCCA 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (N-
M. Ct. Crim. App. June 26, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 77 (C.A.A.F. 2014); United States v. 
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appellate courts are making this determination even though Article 66(c), 
UCMJ, explicitly states the appellate judges should “recognize that the trial 
court saw and heard the witnesses.”9  This article contends that since 
sufficient protections are now in place in the military justice system, the 
military courts of criminal appeals no longer require factual sufficiency 
review authority to protect an accused tried by courts-martial, and 
furthermore, military criminal courts of appeals should have the same 
standard of review as other federal criminal courts, that is, a conviction 
should be tested for legal sufficiency. 
The factual sufficiency standard for appellate review is an anachronism 
from an era when military justice was substantially different from what it is 
today. This standard has been employed to reverse hard-won sex offense 
convictions under Article 120, as appellate judges determine that 
intoxicated victims are not credible. Therefore, this article also contends 
that military criminal law should include a clear definition of incapacitation 
to assist the trier of fact in determining when a victim is incapacitated and 
impaired by alcohol or drugs, and to improve the probability that the case 
will withstand appellate review. 
II. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW AUTHORITY OF MILITARY APPELLATE 
COURTS 
As set forth in Article 66, UCMJ, the jurisdiction of Service courts of 
criminal appeals includes automatic review of cases (from within each 
Service) with sentences that include death, a punitive discharge, or at least a 
year of confinement.10 A Service court of criminal appeals is limited in 
approving the findings and sentences of courts-martial and  
 
[M]ay affirm only such findings of guilty and the sentence or such part or 
amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, 
on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.  In considering the 
record, it may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and 
 
Nicely, ACM 36730, 2007 CCA LEXIS 322 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2007); see also Mark 
D. Sameit, When A Convicted Rape Is Not Really a Rape: The Past, Present, and Future Ability of 
Article 120 Convictions to Withstand Legal and Factual Sufficiency Reviews, 216 MIL. L. REV. 
77, 94-109 (2013).  
9. UCMJ, supra note 4. 
 10. Service courts do not review cases when the accused withdraws his case from review or 
waives appellate review, except if an accused is sentenced to death since a person with a capital 
sentence is not permitted to waive appellate review. GREGORY MAGGS & LISA SCHENCK, 
MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 417 (2d ed. 2015). 
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determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court 
saw and heard the witnesses.11   
 
Although military appellate courts have the responsibility to review 
cases for both legal sufficiency12 and factual sufficiency, factual sufficiency 
review has proven more controversial. Legal sufficiency review as 
exercised by most courts involves reviewing cases to ensure some evidence 
was admitted at trial to fulfill each required element of proof.  In assessing 
factual sufficiency, unlike legal sufficiency review, military appellate 
judges may assess the quality and credibility of the trial evidence.  
Furthermore, the legal sufficiency standard of review is more deferential to 
the trial court’s findings of guilty, requiring courts to view “the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution.”13 In contrast, when reviewing 
courts-martial cases “[f]or factual sufficiency, the test is whether, after 
weighing the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not 
having personally observed the witnesses, [the appellate military court is] 
convinced of [the appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”14 
 
 11. UCMJ, supra note 4, art. 66(c) (West 1996).   
 12. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 867, art. 67, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(comprised of five civilian judges and sits as the superior court for the Service courts of criminal 
appeals) also conducts a legal sufficiency review of courts-martial cases within its jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applies the same legal sufficiency standard of review 
applied in U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. See United States v. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 
(C.A.A.F. 2015) (citing United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))); United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 
2001); see also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text, for standard of review applied by the 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals.      
 13. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. at 65. 
 14. Turner, 25 M.J. at 325. On December 28, 2015, the Department of Defense’s Military 
Justice Review Group (MJRG) presented proposed legislation resulting from its comprehensive 
assessment of “the structure and operation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and 
the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).”  MIL. JUST. REV. GROUP, http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/ 
mjrg.html. The MJRG review recommended that Congress modify, but retain the factual 
sufficiency review authority of the Service courts of criminal appeals. The proposed factual 
sufficiency standard is as follows: 
[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals, upon request of the accused, may consider the weight 
of the evidence upon a specific showing of deficiencies in proof by the accused. The 
Court may set aside and dismiss a finding if clearly convinced that the finding was 
against the weight of the evidence. The Court may affirm a lesser finding. A rehearing 
may not be ordered. . . . the Court may weigh the evidence and determine controverted 
questions of fact, subject to—(A) appropriate deference to the fact that the court-martial 
saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence; and (B) appropriate deference to 
findings of fact entered into the record by the military judge. 
Title IX, Sec. 910(e)(1), http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/military_justice2016.pdf. In the 
Section-by-Section analysis, the MJRG explained the rationale for the change as follows: 
Article 66(e) details the limited authorities of the Courts of Criminal Appeals to weigh 
and consider evidence. The Court’s authority to set aside a finding that is contrary to 
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Military appellate courts were granted factual sufficiency review 
authority as one of many reforms in military justice identified as part of the 
complete reviews and substantial changes to military law that occurred after 
wars.15  The predecessors of the military appellate courts—the Boards of 
Review—were created after the outcry about a notorious World War I 
court-martial in which 63 African American soldiers were tried for the 
murder of 15 white men during a riot in Houston, Texas.16 The 63 soldiers 
were represented by a single non-lawyer officer, who had some legal 
experience, raising profound conflict-of-interest concerns; key soldier 
witnesses accused of murder testified after grants of immunity. Forty-one 
soldiers were sentenced to life in prison; 13 were sentenced to death; and 
the 13 executions were carried out two days after the accused soldiers were 
informed that they would be hung.17  The capital cases were not reviewed 
outside the local command holding the trials.18  In 1951, the Department of 
Defense responded to concerns by submitting its military justice legislative 
proposal to Congress, and the proposal briefly described the history of the 
military appellate process, noting the aftermath of the Houston riot cases as 
follows: 
 
This was summary justice—but too summary for a citizen Army of the 
twentieth century. The summary disposition of the Houston riot case 
created quite a reaction among the public and also in the War Department. 
Very promptly thereafter the War Department promulgated General Order 
 
the weight of the evidence would be retained, but would require the accused to identify 
deficiencies in the proof and would allow the Court to set aside such findings only if 
“clearly convinced that the finding was against the weight of the evidence.” This would 
channel the exercise of such authority through standards that are more deferential to the 
factfinder at trial and more reviewable by higher courts. 
  Article 66(e)(2) would address consideration of the entire case, including a finding 
of guilty and the sentence. The Court’s authority to weigh the evidence and to 
determine controverted questions of fact would be retained, but would channel the 
exercise of such authority through standards that are more deferential to the factfinder 
at trial. This change would enable application of differing standards of review tailored 
to widely varied matters, including rulings on pretrial motions, the findings and 
sentence adjudged by the court-martial, and sentences of death determined by members.  
MJRG, Military Justice Act of 2016, Section-by-Section Analysis at 28, http://www.dod.gov/ 
dodgc/ images/military_justice_sectional.pdf. 
 15. See David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for 
Reform, 73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 195 (2015) (“[C]alls for reform followed World War I, World War 
II, and the Vietnam conflict.”). 
 16. Fred L. Borch III, “The Largest Murder Trial in the History of the United States”: The 
Houston Riots Courts-Martial of 1917, ARMY LAW. 1-3 (2011). 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. Id. at 2-3; see also, Terry W. Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of 
General Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1967); Frederick B. Wiener, The Seamy Side of the 
World War I Court-Martial Controversy, 123 MIL. L. REV. 109, 120 (1989). 
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No. 7, 1918, which required review by a board of review in the Office of 
the Judge Advocate General or in a branch office before any serious 
sentence by court-martial could be carried into execution. General Order 
No. 7 served as a pattern for appellate review in the Army. Its essential 
provisions became statutory in 1920 as Article of War 50 1/2. It was 
modified by Article of War 50 in the 1948 revision of the Articles of War 
which empowered the boards of review to weigh evidence, judge the 
credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact. A 
judicial council for the further review of serious cases, with power to 
consider the propriety as well as the legality of sentences was also 
created.19 
 
Accordingly, Congress, in the 1950 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
included Article 66(c), granting military appellate courts (then known as 
Boards of Review) the power to review cases for factual sufficiency, the 
same standard of review as those courts have today.20  Prior to 1950, the 
Boards of Review had limited authority, could not disapprove findings of 
guilt, and made non-binding recommendations based on legal sufficiency, 
not factual sufficiency.21  The 1950 UCMJ amendments were designed to 
curtail many of the abuses observed in the World War II-era courts-martial, 
especially unlawful command influence.22  During World War II, sixteen 
 
 19. Legal and Legislative Basis for the Manual for Courts-Martial, DEPT. ARMY 147 (1951), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/CM-1951.pdf. 
 20. UCMJ, supra note 4, art. 66(c) (1950) (“In a case referred to it, the board of review shall 
act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by proper authority. It shall affirm 
only such findings of guilty or such part of a finding of guilty as includes a lesser included 
offense, and the sentence or such part of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and 
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved.”); see Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, ¶ 100 (May 31, 1951), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ 
pdf/manual-1951.pdf. 
 21. See 1921 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1921, ¶ 399(a) (citing 
Article 50 ½ UCMJ and providing detailed responsibilities for Boards of Review and describing 
disposition when higher review authorities in the Executive Branch received the recommendations 
of the Board of Review). 
 22. See also United States v. Norfleet, 53 M.J. 262, 266-67 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (“The 
substantial criticism of the military justice system as it operated in World War II led to enactment 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which contained a wide variety of reforms designed to 
minimize the influence of command over the court-martial process.”); Edmund M. Morgan, The 
Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953); H.R. REP. 491, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/report_02.pdf (“At the conclusion of World War II, 
there was considerable discussion and criticism of the justice systems of the Army and the Navy 
which at that time embraced all of the military services.  As a result of this criticism both 
departments created several independent boards and committees to review wartime courts-martial 
cases and also to study their court-martial systems.”); Matt C. Pinsker, Ending the Military’s 
Courts of Criminal Appeals De Novo Review of Findings of Fact, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 471, 
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million men and women served in the Armed Forces; 1.7 million courts-
martial (mostly-low level summary courts-martial) were convened; 97 
percent of those tried by courts-martial were convicted; and 45,000 were 
imprisoned. The Army carried out more than 100 executions of Army 
personnel during World War II.23  Those World War II veterans returned to 
the United States and described a multitude of problems in the fairness and 
due process of courts-martial.24  “One post-war study found that court-
martial sentences were ‘fantastically’ severe; another board set aside or 
reduced about 85 percent of the 27,500 general court-martial convictions it 
reviewed.”25  
Congress’ enactment of the UCMJ was “prompted by a desire to meet 
objections and criticisms lodged against court-martial procedures in the 
aftermath of World War II.”26 The UCMJ was not “a patchwork effort to 
 
480 (2014) (citing Andrew S. Effron, United States v. Dubay and the Evolution of Military Law, 
207 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011)); Homcy v. Resor, 455 F.2d 1345, 1352-57 (D.C. Cir. 1971) 
(describing convening authority’s improper communications to court members, and setting aside 
accused’s dishonorable discharge adjudged during World War II court-martial).    
 23. Effron, supra note 22, at 7 (citing JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 128 
(1992)); Pinsker, supra note 22, at 480 (citing John T. Willis, The United States Court of Military 
Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 MIL. L. REV. 39, 39-41 (1972)). 
 24. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE 21-23 (Comm. Print 1946), available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ 
pdf/Vanderbilt-A_Summary.pdf (describing criticisms of courts-martial, particularly unlawful 
command influence and command abuses, and recommending various remedies including “Boards 
of Review should review all cases involving confinement for more than six months, instead of 
only those involving executed dishonorable discharges [and] Boards of Review should be 
permitted to consider issues of both law and fact . . . .”); see also Pinsker, supra 22, at 480-84.   
 25. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 196 n.15 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing WILLIAM T. 
GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE 14-15, 17 (1973); Note, Collateral Attack on Courts-Martial in the Federal Courts, 57 
YALE L.J. 483, 488 (1948)). 
 26. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (citations omitted). The legislative history of 
the 1950 UCMJ includes several examples of courts-martial abuses during World War II including 
the following: 
In Shapiro v. United States (69 F.Supp. 205 (Ct. Claims, 1947)), the plaintiff was 
appointed to defend before a court-martial an American soldier of Mexican descent 
who was charged with assault with intent to commit rape. In order to demonstrate the 
mistake in identification by the prosecuting witnesses, the plaintiff substituted for the 
accused at the court-martial trial another American soldier of Mexican descent. This 
substitute was identified by the prosecuting witnesses as the attacker and was 
convicted. The plaintiff thereupon informed the court of the deception he had practiced, 
whereupon the real defendant was brought to trial, was also identified as the attacker, 
and was convicted and sentenced. Several days later Lieutenant Shapiro, the plaintiff, 
was arrested. A day or two after at 12:40 p.m., he was served with charges of effecting 
a delay in the orderly progress of the general court-martial. He was then notified that he 
would be tried at 2 p.m. on the same day, . . . He was convicted at 3:30 that afternoon 
and was dismissed from the service. Judge Whitaker characterized the proceedings as 
follows (69 F. Supp. at 207): “A more flagrant case of military despotism would be 
hard to imagine.” 
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plug loopholes in the old system of military justice. The revised Articles 
and the new Code [were] the result of painstaking study; they reflect[ed] an 
effort to reform and modernize the system -- from top to bottom.”27 
Congress envisioned factual sufficiency review as one remedy to protect the 
rights of the accused.28  Factual sufficiency review authority was designed 
to ensure that courts-martial were not subject to improper influences.29 
Allowing military appellate courts the ability to conduct a factual 
sufficiency review of courts-martial provided “an important check on a 
commander’s power to influence proceedings and outcomes,” and “their 
plenary power of review, would enable [military appellate courts] to make 
changes in the interests of justice if the trial record did not support the 
conviction or sentence.”30 Today, the military justice system includes 
 
H.R. Rep. S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 65 n.21 (1949), https://www.loc.gov/ 
rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/hearings_02.pdf (citing Arthur E. Farmer & Richard H. Wels, “Command 
Control-or Military Justice,” 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 263 (1949)). 
 27. Burns, 346 U.S. at 141. 
 28. See Pinsker, supra note 22, at 480-89.   
 29. Unlawful command influence can take many forms, and it can arise at any stage of a 
court-martial when a higher-level commander improperly influences a lower-level commander’s 
disposition decision, improperly acts as an accuser, has an inflexible attitude towards punishment, 
or when a convening authority or staff judge advocate employs improper methods of selection of 
court members, or improper influence on court members or witnesses occurs. Robert Burrell, 
Recent Developments in Appellate Review of Unlawful Command Influence, 2000 ARMY LAW. 1, 
4-15 (May 2000) (citations omitted). Unlawful command influence analysis focuses on “the 
fairness of the proceeding.”  United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 415 (C.A.A.F. 2006). UCMJ, 
article 37(a) prohibits unlawfully influencing the action of a court-martial: 
No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial, nor any other 
commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, 
military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by 
the court, or with respect to any other exercises of its or his functions in the conduct of 
the proceedings. No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any 
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military 
tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the 
action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial 
acts. 
 30. See Pinsker, supra note 22, at 486. Concerns regarding the fairness of the military justice 
system and trials by courts-martial persisted after 1950, and in 1969, the Supreme Court even 
limited courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses, declaring that, “courts-martial as an institution 
[were] singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law.”  O’Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969). With multiple procedural changes that civilianized military 
justice, in 1983 the Supreme Court subsequently “abandoned” the “service connection” limitation 
on courts-martial jurisdiction.  Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441 (1987); Major General 
Jack L. Rives & Major Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice in the United States: 
A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. REV. 213 (2002); see also R. Chuck Mason, Military Justice: 
Courts-Martial, An Overview, CONG. RES. SERV. R41739 (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41739.pdf (providing a brief discussion on the military 
justice system, including a comparison of procedural safeguards in U.S. District Courts and 
courts-martial). 
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numerous protections to guard against unlawful command influence, 
including a prohibition on command influence (i.e., Article 37, UCMJ) and 
a punitive article to enforce this prohibition (i.e., Article 98, UCMJ).31  
Also, commanders have much less control over the courts-martial 
proceedings because military judges are now part of a separate trial 
judiciary and at trial, they are bound by the Military Rules of Evidence and 
Rules for Courts-Martial. Military defense counsel at trial and appellate 
levels are provided at no expense to the accused or appellant in every 
case.32    
“At trial, the accused is entitled to virtually the same procedural 
protections he would have in a state or federal criminal court.”33  Factual 
sufficiency review is no longer necessary to ensure the fairness of the 
military justice system, and, regardless, most courts do not have the 
authority to review criminal cases for factual sufficiency.  While some 
states employ limited factual reviews in civil cases,34 it seems that New 
York is the only state where criminal cases receive factual sufficiency 
review at the appellate level.35   
 
 31. See Burrell, supra note 29, at 1, 4-5, 9, 14 (discussing application of UCMJ, article 37). 
See generally Martha Huntley Bower, Unlawful Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate 
Balance, 28 A.F. L. Rev. 65 (1988); Larry A. Gaydos & Michael Warren, What Commanders 
Need to Know About Unlawful Command Control, ARMY LAW. 1, 9 (Oct. 1986); James D. Harty, 
Unlawful Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 231 (1986). 
 32. Bower, supra note 31, at 68-69. 
 33. Schlueter, supra note 15, at 202; see David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice 
Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2013) (listing pretrial, trial, and 
post-trial court-martial procedures). 
 34. Pinsker, supra note 22, at 478-79 (citations omitted). 
 35. See Jason Hanna, Comment, Brooks v. State, the Standard Was Raised, but the Bar Was 
Lowered: If Texas Appellate Courts Cannot Protect the Accused, Who Will?, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 
373, 387 (2013) (noting that Florida ended factual sufficiency appellate reviews for convictions in 
1981 and Texas ended factual sufficiency review in 2010); Elizabeth A. Ryan, Comment, The 
13th Juror: Re-evaluating the Need for a Factual Sufficiency Review in Criminal Cases, 37 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1291, 1316-17 (2005); see also Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 926 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2010) (plurality opinion); Tibbs v. Florida, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1125 (1981), aff’d, 457 U.S. 31 
(1982). The only state that continues to have factual sufficiency review for appeal of criminal 
cases is New York.  See N.Y. CRIM. L. SERV., CRIM. PROC. L, art. 470.15 (2015) (stating in part, 
“3. A reversal or a modification of a judgment, sentence or order must be based upon a 
determination made: (a) Upon the law; or (b) Upon the facts; or (c) As a matter of discretion in the 
interest of justice; or (d) Upon any two or all three of the bases specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and 
(c). . . . 5. The kinds of determinations of reversal or modification deemed to be on the facts 
include, but are not limited to, a determination that a verdict of conviction resulting in a judgment 
was, in whole or in part, against the weight of the evidence.”); People v Cannon, 300 A.D.2d 407, 
408 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 2002) (“Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are 
satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CRIM. PROC. L., 
art 470.15[5]).”). 
SCHENCK.FINAL2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  4:59 PM 
532 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 45 
Similar to the military courts of criminal appeals, in appeals of U.S. 
District Court decisions, federal circuit courts review the sufficiency of the 
evidence de novo.36  However, military courts of criminal appeals view the 
evidence much differently than the federal circuit courts that are required to 
view the “evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving 
conflicts in the government’s favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences 
that support the verdict.”37 In U.S. District Courts, credibility 
determinations are left to the judge or jury, and appellate courts will not 
second guess those determinations.38 Federal circuit courts will reverse a 
criminal conviction “only if no reasonable jury could have found guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”39   
III. “INCAPACITATED” UNDER ARTICLE 120, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE (UCMJ) 
Rather than using factual sufficiency review authority to correct 
unlawful command influence issues, Service courts of criminal appeals 
recently have used this review authority to overturn sexual assault cases.  
This may be, in part, due to the Article 120, UCMJ statute itself.  
 
 36. United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754, 763 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. 
Gray, 700 F.3d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 2012)).   
 37. Id. (citing Gray, 700 F.3d at 378). 
 38. United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2009) (declining to discount testimony 
of victim who was intoxicated at time of offense because of inconsistencies in her statements); 
United States v. Ramirez, 635 F.3d 249, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Because the issue is one of legal 
sufficiency, the court ‘neither independently weighs the evidence, nor judges the credibility of 
witnesses who testified at trial.”); United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999). An 
appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 
618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). “[C]ircumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and . . . 
[such] evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” United States 
v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir. 1984). This standard is a great obstacle to overcome, United 
States v. Winkle, 477 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2007), and presents the appellant in a criminal case 
with a “very heavy burden,” United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 39. Bruguier, 735 F.3d at 763 (citing Gray, 700 F.3d at 378); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 (C.A.A.F 2015) (“[I]n 
reviewing for legal sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question an appellate court must 
answer is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”); United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1322 n.10 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(citation omitted) (“We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and look at the record in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in its favor.”); United 
States v. Keys, 721 F.3d 512, 518-19 (8th Cir. 2013) (sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de 
novo; evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution; conflicts are resolved in 
the prosecution’s favor; and all reasonable inferences that support the verdict are accepted). 
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A. Sexual Assault Offenses in the Military: Article 120, UCMJ 
Substantive military criminal law is provided in the punitive articles in 
the UCMJ.40 Originally, sexual assault offenses were set forth in two 
enumerated articles, “Rape and Carnal Knowledge” (Article 120), and 
“Sodomy” (Article 125); the general article further established a category of 
sex offenses under “Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts or Liberties with a 
Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another” (Article 
134). Subsequent statutory changes have revised and combined these 
punitive articles, including the offense of rape, under Article 120, UCMJ.41 
 
 40. See UCMJ, supra note 4, §§ 877–934 (West 2006). The UCMJ punitive articles are listed 
in Appendix 2 of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf [hereinafter 2012 MCM]. 
Presidential executive orders and various Service regulations provide important substantive 
military criminal law; see 2012 MCM; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, Reg. 27–10 (2011). On June 30, 
1775, the Second Continental Congress established sixty-nine Articles of War, governing the 
conduct of the Continental Army. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 21-22 
(2d ed. 1920).  In 1789, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution granted Congress the power 
to regulate the land and naval forces; in 1806, Congress used this authority and enacted 101 
Articles of War, superseding the Revolutionary War articles, providing the Army punitive articles.  
Id. at 23. The Articles for the Government of the United States Navy provided the Navy with its 
disciplinary framework.  See DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY—NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-
alphabetically/a/articles-government-united-states-navy-1930.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). In 
1950 (effective on May 31, 1951), Congress passed, and President Harry S. Truman signed, the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice unifying the disciplinary framework for the Services.  UNIFORM 
CODE OF MIL. JUST., http://www.ucmj.us/history-of-the-ucm (last visited Feb 1, 2016). 
 41. Prior to these changes, rape under the UCMJ reflected the common law, as “an act of 
sexual intercourse, by force and without consent[.]” UCMJ, supra note 4, art. 120(a) (2006) 
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (West 2006)). This definition was widely criticized because of the 
lack of an “obvious or plain” definition of “force” and the focus on the victim’s conduct rather 
than the accused’s conduct along with the absence of culpability-based gradations of conduct and 
punishments (that may be more effective in deterring crime).  Major Timothy W. Murphy, 
U.S.A.F., A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F.L. REV. 19, 19–23 (1996); see also 
MARK HARVEY, SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ: A REPORT FOR THE JOINT SERVICE COMMITTEE 
ON MILITARY JUSTICE (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO JSC]; DEP’T OF 
DEF. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, Comparison of Title 18 Sexual Offenses and UCMJ Sexual 
Offenses, (May 2005), http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/php/docs/comparison_with_Title18_3-2-05.pdf 
(describing courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses and the jurisprudence of military rape 
prosecutions over the past hundred years). As the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces decided 
in 2005, UCMJ, Article 120 failed to “reflect the more recent trend for rape statutes to recognize 
gradations in the offense based on context. . . . [and] its elements [did] not easily fit the range of 
circumstances now generally recognized as ‘rape,’ including date rape, acquaintance rape, 
statutory rape, as well as stranger-on-stranger rape.”  United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (focusing on rape by compulsive influence due to 
holding an authoritative position and citing United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 377 (C.A.A.F. 
2003) (“drill instructor’s coercive influence over recruits”)); United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9 
(C.M.A. 1991) (parental compulsion found to be a form of constructive force); United States v. 
Henderson, 4 C.M.A. 268, 273, 15 C.M.R. 268 (1954) (concept of constructive force recognized 
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Congress has changed military sex offenses and applicable burdens of 
proof twice in the past ten years.42  In 2005, Congress required the Secretary 
of Defense to propose changes to the existing military sex offenses, “to 
conform . . . more closely to other [f]ederal laws and regulations that 
address [sexual assault].”43 Accordingly, based on those proposals, in 2006, 
Congress, created a “new” Article 120 (effective October 2007)44 (“2007 
Article 120”) providing a gradation of sexual assault offenses.  In 2011, 
Congress provided additional changes to Article 120 (effective June 2012)45 
and available defenses (“2012 Article 120”).  This article contends that 
 
as applicable to military). In 2005, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & Violence at 
the Military Service Academies also found that “a key obstacle to increasing accountability for 
rape and sexual assault is that current statutes, though flexible, [did] not reflect the full spectrum 
of criminal sexual behaviors encountered at the military service academies and society at large” 
and recommended “Congress revise the current sexual misconduct statutes to more clearly and 
comprehensively address the full range of sexual misconduct.”  REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK 
FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES ES–2 
(2005), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/high_gpo_rrc_tx.pdf. 
 42. The 2012 MCM, supra note 40, contains the punitive articles, elements of offenses, and 
some definitions applicable to sex offenses committed before October 1, 2007 at Appendix 27; 
committed between October 1, 2007, through June 27, 2012, at Appendix 28; and committed after 
June 27, 2012 at pt. IV, ¶ 45.   
 43. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 
108–375, 118 Stat. 1811, 1920 (2004). Today’s UCMJ, art. 120 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Article 
120] is similar to Title 18, but the latter does not have definitions and the offenses include the term 
“knowingly.”  The term, “knowingly,” is used in many Title 18 offenses to indicate the requisite 
acts were not done inadvertently. For the sex offenses in 18 U.S.C. §§ 224144 (2006), the 
Government need not prove touching the victim was for sexual gratification.  Under military law, 
mistake is an affirmative defense. Most Title 18 offenses include the word “knowingly” but 
“knowingly” is not in most military offenses; rather, “knowingly” is automatically incorporated 
into UCMJ offenses.  See, e.g., 2012 MCM, supra note 40, at pt. IV, ¶ 1.b(2)(a). The definitions in 
2012 Article 120 and 18 U.S.C. § 2246 (2006) of “sexual act” require a sexual penetration of the 
body of the victim (which is more aggravating) versus “sexual contact,” only requiring a sexual 
touching of the victim’s body. Existing federal sexual assault statutes are seldom applied and 
primarily used to prosecute cases on Indian reservations; therefore, federal sex offense cases are 
rarely reviewed on appeal. In FY 2009, the nation’s tribes Uniform Crime Report indicated there 
were 882 forcible rapes, and in FY 2010, they reported 852 rapes. Steven W. Perry, Tribal Crime 
Data Collection Activities, 2012, 9 DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 2012), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tcdca12.pdf. Convictions for sexual abuse of adults from 2007 to 
2012 varied from 87 to 137 per year in U.S. District Courts. See Lisa M. Schenck, Informing the 
Debate About Sexual Assault in the Military Services: Is the Department of Defense Its Own 
Worst Enemy?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 579, 629 n.226 (2014) (citations omitted). Furthermore, in 
2009 and 2011, ninety-seven percent of trials in U.S. district courts were guilty pleas. Michael 
Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady 
Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3602, 3611 (2013).   
 44. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–163, §§ 
551–553, 119 Stat. 3136, 3256–64 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006)). 
[hereinafter 2007 Article 120].  
 45. 2012 MCM, supra note 40, at Appendix 28, ¶ 45. 
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some of these changes are beneficial, but a definition of incapacitation 
should be included in the sexual assault punitive article. 
B. 2007 Article 120   
Using Title 18 sexual assault offenses as the framework, Congress’ 
“new” 2007 Article 120 included the most significant statutory changes to 
military substantive criminal offenses since the establishment of the 1950 
UCMJ. This new Article 120 set forth a gradation of sex offenses based on 
aggravating factors, establishing the following categories:  
 
(a) rape; (b) rape of a child; (c) aggravated sexual assault; (d) aggravated 
sexual assault of a child; (e) aggravated sexual contact; (f) aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child; (g) aggravated sexual contact with a child; (h) 
abusive sexual contact; (i) abusive sexual contact with a child; (j) indecent 
liberty with a child; (k) indecent act; (l) forcible pandering; (m) wrongful 
sexual contact; and (n) indecent exposure.46   
 
Additionally, the 2007 Article 120 included numerous definitions47 and 
limitations on the two most common affirmative defenses, consent and 
mistake of fact as to consent—defenses that were not specifically included 
in the UCMJ sex offenses or in Title 18. These definitions filled a widening 
gap created due to appellate decisions—decisions that provided constant 
changes to the offenses and instructions military trial judges were required 
to provide to panel members.48  
 
 46. 2007 Article 120, supra note 44; see also Lt. Col. Mark L. Johnson, Forks in the Road: 
Recent Developments in Substantive Criminal Law, 2006 ARMY LAW 23, 27 (June 2006). 
 47. Definitions included in the 2007 Article 120 included: (1) sexual act; (2) sexual contact; 
(3) grievous bodily harm; (4) dangerous weapon or object; (5) force; (6) threatening or placing 
that other person in fear for rape and aggravated sexual contact; (7) threatening or placing that 
other person in fear for aggravated sexual assault and abusive sexual contact; (8) bodily harm; (9) 
child; (10) lewd act; (11) indecent liberty; (12) indecent conduct; (13) act of prostitution; (14) 
consent; (15) mistake of fact as to consent; and (16) affirmative defense.  2012 MCM, App.28. 
 48. The 2007 Article 120 moved Article 134 sex offenses “Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts 
or Liberties with a Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another;” to Article 
120, and amended Article 134, “Indecent Language” communicated to another.  UCMJ, art. 134, 
2012 MCM, supra note 40, at pt. IV, at ¶¶ 61113 [hereinafter Article 134]. Article 134 
criminalizes “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed 
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses 
not capital,” and Article 134 clause 3 incorporates the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 13 (2006).  2012 MCM, supra note 40, at pt. IV, at ¶ 60c(34).     
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C. 2012 Article 120    
The statutory changes to Article 120, effective June 28, 2012, included 
providing separate provisions for adult victims (Article 120(a)), child 
victims (Article 120(b)), and other sex offenses (Article 120(c)); Congress 
further divided the first two categories into the following offenses: (a) rape; 
(b) sexual assault; (c) aggravated sexual contact; and (d) abusive sexual 
contact. Statutory changes49 included shifting the focus to the accused’s 
perception of the victim’s behavior and whether the accused knew or 
reasonably should have known whether the victim was consenting.   
Specifically, the 2012 Article 120(b)(23) modified the 2007 Article 
120 definition of  “aggravated sexual assault” as follows (underlined 
provisions were added and strike through portions deleted): 
 
(c) (b) Aggravated Sexual Assault—Any person subject to this chapter 
who— 
(1) causes commits a sexual act upon another person of any age to 
engage in a  
sexual act by— 
(A) threatening or placing that other person in fear; or 
(B) causing bodily harm to that other person; or 
(C) making a fraudulent representation that the sexual act served 
a professional purpose; or 
(D) inducing a belief by any artifice, pretense, or concealment 
that the person is another person; 
(2) engages in a sexual act with another person of any age, if that other 
person is substantially incapacitated or substantially incapable of 
(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act;  
(B) declining participating in the sexual act; or  
(C) communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act;  
 
(2) commits a sexual act upon another person when the person knows or 
reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or 
otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring; or 
 
 
 49. The changes also eliminated the burden shift for the affirmative defenses of consent and 
mistake of fact as to consent.  See Lisa M. Schenck, Sex Offenses Under Military Law:  Will the 
Recent Changes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Re-Traumatize Sexual Assault 
Survivors in the Courtroom?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 439, 448, 456-57 (2014).  
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(3) commits a sexual act upon another person when the other person is 
incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to— 
   (A) impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, 
and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the 
person; or  
    (B) a mental disease or defect, or physical disability, and that 
condition is known or reasonably should be known by the person; is 
guilty of aggravated sexual assault and shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.50    
 
Not only did the 2012 Article 120 replace “[t]he term substantially 
incapacitated . . . with ‘asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the 
sexual act is occurring,’ or situations in which a drug or intoxicant renders 
the victim incapable of consenting[,]”51 the 2012 statute also redefined 
“consent” as follows: 
 
(14)(8) Consent. 
(A) The term ‘consent’ means words or overt acts indicating a freely given 
agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a competent person. An 
expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no 
consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting 
from the accused’s use of force, threat of force, or placing another person 
in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating or social 
or sexual relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person 
involved with the accused in the conduct at issue shall not constitute 
consent. A person cannot consent to sexual activity if— 
(A) under 16 years of age; or 
(B) substantially incapable of— 
(i) appraising the nature of the sexual 
conduct at issue due to— 
(I) mental impairment or unconsciousness resulting from 
consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, a similar substance, or otherwise; or 
(II) mental disease or defect that renders the person unable to 
understand the nature of the sexual conduct at issue; 
(ii) physically declining participation in the sexual conduct at 
issue; or 
 
 50. 2012 Article 120(b)(23), 2012 MCM, supra note 40, pt. IV, at ¶ 45 (emphasis added). 
 51. Lindsay L. Rodman, Fostering Constructive Dialogue on Military Sexual Assault, JOINT 
FORCE Q., NAT’L DEF. U., 25, 31 (2nd Quarter, 2013). 
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(iii) physically communicating unwillingness to engage in the 
sexual conduct at issue. 
 
(B) A sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent. 
A person cannot consent to force causing or likely to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm or to being rendered unconscious. A person 
cannot consent while under threat or fear or under the circumstances 
described in subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (b)(1). 
 
(C) Lack of consent may be inferred based on the circumstances of 
the offense. All the surrounding circumstances are to be considered in 
determining whether a person gave consent, or whether a person did 
not resist or ceased to resist only because of another person’s 
actions.52 
 
For cases tried by panels, prior to findings deliberations, military 
judges instruct court members or military juries on elements of the offenses 
and affirmative defenses.  Military judges also provide further instructions 
including definitions that are derived from statutes, executive orders, and 
case law, and compiled by military justice experts and assembled in the 
Military Judges’ Benchbook.53 When relevant to the sexual assault charges 
and specifications, for offenses occurring on or after October 1, 2007 and 
before June 28, 2012, the military judge may provide court-martial panel 
members with the following September 2014 Benchbook definition of the 
terms “substantially incapacitated” and “substantially incapable:” 
 
[These terms mean] that level of mental impairment due to consumption 
of alcohol, drugs, or similar substance; while asleep or unconscious; or for 
other reasons; which rendered the alleged victim unable to appraise the 
nature of the sexual conduct at issue, unable to physically communicate 
unwillingness to engage in the sexual conduct at issue, or otherwise unable 
to make or communicate competent decisions.54 
 
 
 52. 2012 Article 120a(g)(8), 2012 MCM, supra note 40, pt. IV, at ¶ 45. 
 53. The current official Military Judges’ Benchbook, Dept. of the Army Pam. 27-9, was 
published September 10, 2014. The Benchbook is frequently changed to reflect the latest court 
decisions as well as statutory and Manual for Courts-Martial changes. A September 1, 2015 
“unofficial” version is also available at 
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/sites/trialjudiciary.nsf/homeContent.xsp?open&documentId=80086
608B92177D285257B48006924A1.   
 54. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, Dept. of the Army Pam., 27-9, 523, 525 (Sept. 10, 
2014) [hereinafter 2014 Benchbook]. 
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The statute, rather than the Benchbook, should include the definition of 
“substantially incapacitated” and the word “substantially” should be 
inserted before the word “unable” each time “unable” appears in the quoted 
passage, to ensure that the required legal standard for a finding of guilty 
may require less than a victim’s complete intoxication or total 
incapacitation.   Essentially, the statute should include specific examples, 
such as those listed in the 2007 Article 120 defining consent and substantial 
incapacitation, which clarified for the fact finder when a victim was 
incapable of consenting and what specific circumstances satisfied the 
elements of proof.   
The importance of definitions in panel instructions is reflected in 
military appellate court opinions.  For example, in United States v. Brown,55 
the Army Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a conviction where the military 
judge used a modified instruction (modifications bolded and underlined 
below) defining the term “substantially incapacitated” as follows:   
 
“Substantially incapacitated” means that level of mental impairment due 
to consumption of alcohol, drugs, or similar substance; while asleep or 
unconscious; or for other reasons; which rendered the alleged victim 
unable to appraise the nature of the sexual conduct at issue, unable to 
physically communicate unwillingness to engage in the sexual conduct at 
issue, unable to decline participation in the sexual act, or otherwise 
unable to make or communicate competent decisions.56   
 
Under this definition, it is easy to envision cases that can arise when 
the victim is either passed out or blacked out. The Army Court did note that 
there was no explanation for the change in language from Article 120’s 
“competent” in relation to a person, to the term “competent” used to modify 
“decisions” in the Military Judges’ Benchbook.57 In United States v. 
Redmon, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals found factual 
 
 55. United States v. Brown, ACCA 20130177, 2014 WL 7237501, at *2 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 
Nov. 21, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 2015).  The offense occurred on June 3, 2012, 
id. at *1, and the statute in effect between October 1, 2007 and before June 28, 2012 was in effect 
for the Brown case.  
 56. Id. at *2. The current Military Judges’ Benchbook, includes this definition of 
“substantially incapacitated” or “substantially incapable,” except the phrase, “unable to decline 
participation in the sexual act” is not included, apparently because it is redundant with other parts 
of the definition. 2014 Benchbook, supra note 54. 
 57. Brown, supra note 8, at *2. “Since ‘substantial incapacitation’ is a condition under which 
a person is incapable of giving legal consent, the underlying, determinative finding is whether 
consent was or was not given. Here, the panel was properly instructed regarding consent and they 
were charged that the government had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that AB did 
not consent.” Id. at *3. 
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sufficiency for “incapacitation” in a case where the expert findings were 
that the victim was “blacked out” as opposed to passed out, but was still 
unlikely to be able to consent.58 That case also involved the military judge’s 
use of the instruction on incapacitation as it appears in the Benchbook.59   
The most recent Military Judges’ Benchbook (published in 2014) does 
not define the 2012 Article 120 terms “incapacitated,” or “incapable of 
consenting to the sexual conduct due to impairment by a drug, intoxicant, or 
other similar substance.” Since panel members are not provided a specific 
definition for these terms,60 the 2012 Article 120 makes it more difficult to 
convict an accused, and more difficult for a conviction to survive appellate 
factual sufficiency review when the victim experienced a blackout or was 
substantially impaired from excessive alcohol consumption. 
The UCMJ punitive article 120 (i.e., the military’s statutory criminal 
provision) should be modified to once again include within the definition of 
consent the “substantial incapacitation” definition included in 2007, which 
will eliminate the requirement that the victim be completely incapacitated 
before an accused may be found guilty of a sexual assault.  The statute 
should define “substantial incapacitation” as follows:  
 
“Substantially incapacitated” means that level of mental impairment due 
to consumption of alcohol, drugs, or similar substance; while asleep or 
unconscious; or for other reasons; which rendered the alleged victim 
substantially unable to appraise the nature of the sexual conduct at issue, 
substantially unable to physically communicate unwillingness to engage in 
the sexual conduct at issue, substantially unable to decline participation in 
the sexual act, or otherwise substantially unable to make or communicate 
competent decisions.    
IV. MILITARY COURTS OVERTURNING CASES WITH PROBLEMATIC FACTS:  
“BLACKED OUT” VERSUS “PASSED OUT” 
A. Alcohol Consumption as a Factor: “Blacked Out” versus “Passed 
Out” 
The absence of a clear definition of “incapable of consenting” 
accompanying the 2012 Article 120 provisions has become problematic 
 
 58. See United States v. Redmon, NMCCA 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. June 26, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 77 (C.A.A.F. 2014), at *4. 
 59. Id. at *4-5. 
 60. See 2014 Benchbook, supra note 54, at 523-25, ¶ 3–45–5. 
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since military appellate courts have overturned several sexual assault cases 
involving victims impaired by alcohol based on “factual insufficiency.” 
With clear definitions (2007 Article 120) or without clear definitions (2012 
Article 120) regarding the degree of a victim’s impairment, case facts 
themselves may encourage appellate courts to further engage in “arm chair 
quarterbacking” and find factual bases to overturn sexual assault cases. 
Moreover, alcohol seems to play a role in many military sexual assault 
cases. The Department of Defense (DOD) generates elaborate annual 
reports exceeding 1,000 pages discussing sexual assaults and efforts to 
reduce their occurrence.61 The prevalence of the role that alcohol 
consumption plays in sexual assaults is not specifically summarized for the 
DOD as a whole in any one report.  
For example, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, only one Service—the Marine 
Corps—provided a summary indicating the percentage of alcohol-related 
sexual assaults.62 The Marine Corps reported that alcohol consumption 
“continued to be a contributing factor for sexual assault reports.  For the 
868 reports of sexual assault, 44.8% (389) involved alcohol use by the 
victim, subject, or both.”63 The Marine Corps report did not include specific 
relevant information such as how many victims were under the influence of 
alcohol, degree of impairment, or results of any adverse action against the 
alleged perpetrator of the assault when the victim was impaired by alcohol.  
Nevertheless, the FY 2014 RAND Corporation survey of DOD personnel 
did find that “25 percent of men and 41 percent of women had been 
drinking at the time of the assault.”64  Specifically, 47 percent of female 
victims provided an affirmative response to the RAND survey question, 
“They did it when you were so drunk, high, or drugged that you could not 
understand what was happening or could not show them that you were 
unwilling.”65 Forty-one percent replied affirmatively to the survey question 
 
 61. See Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, 
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_Annual/FY14_DoD_SAPRO_Annual_Report_on_Sexua
l_Assault.pdf.   
 62. See Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, Encl. 2: 
Department of the Navy, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Sexual Assault Statistical Report Data Call for 
Sexual Assault in the Military: United States Marine Corps, http://sapr.mil/public/docs/ 
reports/FY14_Annual/FY14_Annual_Report_Enclosure_2_Navy.pdf. 
 63. Id. at 6.  “It is important to acknowledge that alcohol and drug use, as reported here, is 
not derived through empirical evidence such as toxicology reports but rather through self-
reporting and therefore may reflect a reporting bias on behalf of the victim, subject, and collateral 
witnesses.” Id. 
 64. Annex 1, Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the Military, Vol. 2, Estimates for 
Department of Defense Service Members from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study, at xix, 
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY14_Annual/FY14_Annual_Report_Annex_1_RAND.pdf. 
 65. Id. at tbl. 3.8 at 17. 
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indicating, “They did it when you were passed out, asleep, or 
unconscious.”66 
In addition, a victim’s level of intoxication clearly has become a factor 
in cases where military courts have overturned sexual assault convictions 
based on factual insufficiency. At trial, one expert, Dr. Kim Fromme,67 
Ph.D., described levels of alcohol intoxication and the impact on human 
behavior, cognitive abilities, and memory in the court-martial United States 
v. Pease. Dr. Fromme explained that “[a]t higher doses of alcohol as people 
become progressively more intoxicated, they might begin to act in reckless, 
aggressive or even sexually provocative ways.”68 Dr. Fromme further 
identified another effect of alcohol as “alcohol myopia”—when after a 
person who consumes alcohol focuses on immediate effects and risks and 
fails to consider “long-term consequences of [his or her] behavior.”69 
During an alcohol-related blackout, a person: 
 
[I]s still fully conscious. They’re moving around, acting, engaging, 
talking, dancing, driving, engaging in all kinds of behavior, but because of 
alcohol’s inhibition of the transfer of information from short-term memory 
to long-term memory, they simply will be unable to remember those 
decisions or actions they made while in the blackout.70 
 
Furthermore, a person who is in a blacked out state may still “engage in 
voluntary behavior and thought processes. ‘They might make decisions, for 
example, to drive home from a bar, or [engage in other] . . . activities which 
require complex cognitive abilities, but the individual might not remember 
the next day and might, in fact, regret it.’”71 In contrast, a person will 
usually pass out at blood alcohol content (BAC) alcohol levels of 0.30 or 
higher, when the BAC reaches a high enough level “‘that the part of the 
brain that controls consciousness has literally shut down, so those 
individuals have lost consciousness’ and would not easily be roused.”72  
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Dr. Fromme, a University of Texas professor of clinical psychology, specializes in 
alcohol-related studies, especially pertaining to college-aged drinkers. See Kim Fromme, UNIV. 
TEXAS AUSTIN, DEP’T OF PSYCH., http://www.utexas.edu/cola/psychology/faculty/frommek. 
 68. United States v. Pease, 74 M.J. 763, 769 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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B. Military Case Law Regarding “Incapacitated” 
Military appellate courts assessing the factual sufficiency of courts-
martial involving sexual assault crimes consider a myriad of facts, including 
events before and after the offense, the credibility of the witnesses,73 expert 
witness opinions, conflicting testimonies, and corroboration. The court 
reviews the totality of the circumstances presented in the record of trial.74   
Most sexual activity occurs in private, where the only witnesses are the 
complainant (or victim) and the accused.  When the accused claims the 
sexual activity is consensual or claims an honest and reasonable belief that 
the victim consented and there are no eyewitnesses to the sexual assault, the 
military appellate court may meticulously scrutinize the record to assess the 
victim’s credibility.75 Military appellate courts apply a myriad of factors in 
assessing the credibility of victims and witnesses that may adversely impact 
the factual sufficiency determination, including when a case involves 
evidence that the victim: (1) failed to disclose a prior sexual relationship 
with the accused; (2) acts or speaks positively or complimentary toward the 
accused before or after the sexual assault; (3) makes a statement 
inconsistent with his/her trial testimony or testimony during the Article 32 
pre-trial hearing; (4) makes a statement that conflicts with other witnesses’ 
statements regarding such matters as alcohol consumption or comments 
about the accused before or after the sexual assault; (5) fails to make a 
timely report of the sexual assault; (6) might be biased because of the 
possibility of military discipline for fraternization, adultery, or underage 
alcohol consumption; or (7) displays any “complex” behavior, such as 
 
 73. United States v. Torres, NMCCA 201300396, 2014 CCA LEXIS 641, at *10 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 
 74. United States v. Cauley, 45 M.J. 353, 356 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
 75. United States v. House, ACCA 20061064, 2009 CCA LEXIS 192, at *18 (A. Ct. Crim. 
App. Mar. 30, 2009). In United States v. House, the court describes numerous details that 
impeached the victim’s credibility, resulting in the military appellate court’s decision to reverse 
the accused’s rape conviction.  In House, the victim consumed “three beers, four mixed drinks, 
and a shot of tequila over approximately five and one-half hours.” Id. at *5. The victim engaged in 
sexual activity with a lieutenant and then went to sleep.  The accused entered the victim’s hotel 
room in the middle of the night and got into bed with her. She said she believed the lieutenant had 
returned for more sexual activity, and she consented to the sexual activity. Id. at *9-10, *20-21. 
Sexual intercourse with the accused lasted five to ten seconds.  Id. at *9. In a conversation with 
the accused after the sexual intercourse, she realized it was actually the accused and not the 
lieutenant. Id. at *9-10. Despite this startling revelation, she fell asleep, and the accused left her 
room. Id. at *10. The victim awoke before 0345 and reported the rape early in the morning after 
the rape.  Id. at *10-11.  The appellate court did not discuss any expert witness testimony about 
the effects of alcohol consumption, and her alcohol consumption could have explained her failure 
to recognize differences between her lieutenant lover and the accused and falling asleep shortly 
after the sexual intercourse. 
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walking without staggering, that might reflect sufficient capacity to consent. 
The following summary of the military case law illustrates the facts 
appellate courts consider and the conclusions those courts drew in either 
affirming or reversing the court-martial conviction for sexual assault.    
1. 2007 Article 120 “Substantially Incapacitated” Case Law  
a. United States v. Peterson76 and United States v. Lamb77 2010 
The factual scenarios in United States v. Peterson and United States v. 
Lamb are not uncommon and illustrate the interplay between intoxication to 
the extent the victim has a memory “blackout” versus “passes out.” In the 
Peterson case, the appellant, Private (PVT) Peterson invited the female 
victim, a fellow Marine, to his barracks room to “hang out” and drink with 
him and the co-accused, PVT Lamb.  The victim said she drank “two or 
three shots of Jack Daniels and six or seven shots or ‘mouthfuls’ of 
Jaegermeister, listened to music, played with iTunes, and spoke 
telephonically with several friends” who testified that she sounded giddy 
and intoxicated during the telephone conversations.78 A noncommissioned 
officer found the victim asleep in the appellant’s bed and described her as 
impaired but not intoxicated.79 Shortly after being awakened, the victim was 
able to dress without assistance, and she sent a text message to her ex-
boyfriend indicating she was raped. Approximately six hours later, the 
victim’s blood was drawn and the toxicology results indicated the absence 
of any drugs and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) below the threshold 
level for detection (<.02).80 The victim had “little to no memory of the 
events that took place” when she was in the appellant’s room, and “no 
recollection of [PVT Peterson] engaging in any sexual contact with her.”81 
A forensic toxicology expert found the victim’s testimony regarding 
her alcohol consumption inconsistent with the laboratory results, as he 
would have expected a higher BAC level.82 The expert opined that the 
victim’s BAC was between .10 and .15 at the time of the alleged sexual 
assault and that “blacking out” below a .18 is observed only in 10% of the 
 
 76. United States v. Peterson, NMCCA 200900688, 2010 CCA LEXIS 336 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Sept. 21, 2010). 
 77. United States v. Lamb, NMCCA 201000044, 2010 CCA LEXIS 334 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Sept. 21, 2010). 
 78. Id. at *2-3. 
 79. Id. at *3. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at *3-4. 
 82. Id. at *5. 
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population and that “passing out” with a BAC below .20 is not possible.83 
Further, he found that the victim could have suffered an inability to record 
memory and exercise good judgment due to her alcohol consumption, but 
that she did not consume enough alcohol to enter a sedated or “passed out” 
state.84 
Although the jury concluded the victim was “substantially impaired,” 
convicting PVT Peterson of aggravated sexual assault, the Navy-Marine 
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellant’s conviction, 
finding “reasonable doubt as to whether she was substantially 
incapacitated.”85 The appellate court cited the victim’s “memory loss due to 
her alcohol consumption, [that she] became sick and went to sleep after the 
sexual contact” with the appellant, the testimony of the expert witness and 
noncommissioned officer regarding her level of impairment, and the 
appellant’s statement to a criminal investigator that the victim was 
“flirtatious and a willing and active participant in the sexual contact.”86 The 
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the conviction, 
despite as one of the concurring judges cited, the testimony of PVT Hansen, 
who entered the appellant’s barracks room “and observed the alleged victim 
lying stripped on the bed, partially covered by a blanket, armed with ‘a 
thousand yard stare’.” According to PVT Hansen, she was not blinking and 
presented absolutely no movement. PVT Hansen testified that he became so 
concerned that he shook the alleged victim by the jaw, and after realizing no 
response, checked her pulse.”87  
b. United States v. Wood88 2010 
Private First Class (PFC) Wood (the appellant) and the victim (a 
female college student) attended a party in the barracks.89 The victim said 
she had three or four drinks and felt mildly intoxicated (but was not drunk) 
but lost her memory regarding much of the night.90  She awoke to discover 
the appellant on top of her, engaging in intercourse with her; so, she pushed 
 
 83. Id. at *5-6. 
 84. Id. at *6.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *9 (Maksym, S.J., concurring in the result); see also United States v. Peterson, 
NMCCA 200900688, 2010 CCA LEXIS 336, at *8-9 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2010). 
 88. United States v. Wood, NMCCA 200900436, 2010 CCA LEXIS 24 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Jan. 25, 2010). 
 89. Id. at *3. 
 90. Id. at *2-3. 
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him off, and he immediately left the room.91 PFC M, an occupant of the 
room, provided key information, observing the victim getting sick during 
the night; however, after vomiting, and using the bathroom, the victim and 
the appellant talked and flirted in a bed, left the room together, and the 
victim was walking without assistance.92  
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lyons, an expert in forensic toxicology, 
“testified that getting sick, blacking out, and then passing out would not be 
consistent with [the victim’s] testimony of how much she drank.”93 The 
victim’s description of her alcohol consumption would “not produce an 
inability to record memory (black out), much less cause someone to 
experience alcohol induced unconsciousness (pass out).”94 Moreover, “LTC 
Lyons indicated that while unable to record memory or exercise good 
judgment, a person in an alcohol-induced black out is nonetheless capable 
of various tasks, including consenting to sex.”95 
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, in Wood, reversed 
the case for a lack of factual sufficiency, noting 1) the victim’s willingness 
to return to bed with the appellant after using the restroom and 2) the fact 
that both the appellant and the victim agree that the appellant immediately 
terminated the intercourse as soon as the victim pushed him away.96 
c. United States v. Collins97 2011 
In United States v. Collins, the victim, Lance Corporal (LCpl) S 
became drunk when she attended a barracks party with her friend and 
subsequent roommate, PFC D.98 PFC D helped LCpl S get to her barracks 
room, “placed her on her bed fully clothed, and checked on her periodically. 
The third time PFC D checked on LCpl S, she saw that [LCpl Collins, the 
appellant] was in bed with her, in a spooning position, and both were 
stripped to the waist.” 99 PFC D “left the room, but the sight of [LCpl 
Collins] in bed with her friend brought back PFC D’s own memories of 
being sexually assaulted amidst a drinking binge. Two Marines testified that 
 
 91. Id. at *1.  
 92. Id. at *3. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *1, *3. 
 97. United States v. Collins, NMCCA 201000020, 2011 CCA LEXIS 22 (N-M. Ct. Crim. 
App. Feb. 17, 2011). 
 98. Id. at *1. 
 99. Id. 
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PFC D then became hysterical and inconsolable.”100 Determined to get the 
appellant out of LCpl S’s room, PFC D, with the assistance of another 
Marine, chased the surprised appellant out of LCpl S’s room.101 The 
appellant exclaimed, “It’s not my fault that I woke up to her sucking my 
[penis].” 102 PFC D testified that LCpl S was awake and alert and said “that 
she felt like a slut, that she never hooked up with guys and stated, ‘I don't 
ever do this. I don’t ever do this.’ Shortly after the appellant was removed 
from her room, LCpl S got dressed and tried to physically attack her 
assailant.” 103 At a pretrial hearing pursuant to Article 32, UCMJ, LCpl S 
admitted she lied about her underage drinking to a military police 
woman.104  
A prosecution toxicology expert, Jon Jemiomek, reviewing LCpl S’s 
blood test results estimated her BAC was approximately 0.18 to 0.23 
percent at the time of the alleged sexual assault. This expert opined that a 
person with that BAC level may experience “a fragmentary blackout,” 
which involves forgetting some events in full or in part and the sequence of 
actions.”105 A person is able to “interact with others, appear conscious, and 
appear to be making active decisions,” while in a blackout state.106 A person 
interacting with another person while in a blackout state may not be able to 
recognize that “the drinker was experiencing a blackout.”107 He concluded 
that passing out occurs at a BAC of 0.28 to 0.35 percent.108 “[A] person 
with that amount of alcohol would not be able to dress quickly and play a 
video game, both of which LCpl S was able to do shortly after PFC D 
chased the appellant out from her room.” 109 
The appellant said in a pretrial statement that he went to LCpl S’s room 
to retrieve a shirt and “[w]hile there, he noticed LCpl S was sleeping on top 
of her blankets, so he took the shirt to the person who wanted it, then 
returned to the room to cover her, and that was when she pulled him down 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at *2. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at *3. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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on top of her.”110 He claimed that they then engaged in consensual sexual 
intercourse.111 
The defense contended that LCpl S—“to avoid embarrassment in front 
of her peers”— falsely reported the sexual assault in response to PFC D’s 
reaction to finding the appellant and LCpl S naked in bed together.112 On 
appeal, the court exercising its factual sufficiency review authority 
concluded, “LCpl S’s disregard of her oath at the Article 32 hearing makes 
her an unreliable witness.”113 The court further found that the prosecution 
failed to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that LCpl S was incapacitated at 
the time she and the appellant engaged in sexual intercourse,” and set aside 
LCpl Collin’s conviction for sexual assault.114 
2. 2012 Article 120 “Incapacitated” Case Law  
a. United States v. Pease115 2015 
The Pease case involved two complainants who also could not recall 
some details of a sexual interaction with Information Systems Technician 
Second Class (IT2) Pease, the appellant.116 A court-martial panel composed 
of officers and at least one-third enlisted members convicted the appellant 
of sexually assaulting two complainants and fraternization and sentenced 
the appellant to six years confinement and a dishonorable discharge.117  The 
complainants, two female enlisted women, Information Systems Technician 
Seaman (ITSN) S.K., and IT2 B.S. alleged that, in separate incidents, the 
appellant sexually assaulted them.  ITSN S.K., IT2 B.S., and IT2 Pease 
were all assigned to the same division of the same ship, which was in port 
overseas.118  
After ITSN S.K. engaged in an evening of heavy drinking, the 
appellant escorted her back to the ship.119 She was “able to walk on her own 
without falling or stumbling” and could “negotiate the ladder well, request 
and obtain permission to come aboard [her ship], and scan her identification 
 
 110. Id.   
 111. Id.   
 112. Id. at *5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. United States v. Pease, 74 M.J. 763, 770 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J. 180 
(C.A.A.F. 2016). 
 116. Pease, 74 M.J. at 764-68. 
 117. Id. at 764. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 765-66. 
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without any issue.”120 She remembered walking on the ship and described 
her recollections of the incident with the appellant as follows: 
 
She recalled being on the smoke deck smoking a cigarette, telling [IT2 
Pease] she thought “he was cute” and that they kissed. The next thing 
ITSN S.K. remembered was being “in the [ship’s joint operations center] 
having sex.” ITSN S.K. recalled that she was lying back on a table and 
holding her weight up by propping her elbows on the table. [IT2 Pease] 
was standing in front of her while they engaged in vaginal intercourse. She 
testified at trial—although she had not reported this in previous statements 
or testimony—that afterward, “he smacked my face and kept hold of it and 
like focused my attention on him and said, ‘Don’t tell – don’t ever tell 
anyone.’” Her next memory was waking up in the morning in her rack in 
berthing.121 
 
The next day, ITSN S.K. told a shipmate that “she had sex with [IT2 
Pease] the night before . . . . she also said, ‘What’s wrong with me?’ and 
‘Why did I do that?’ A few days later, ITSN S.K. [said] that she had sex 
with [IT2 Pease] and thought he was cute.”122 
Fifty days after the incident with ITSN S.K., IT2 B.S. drank heavily at 
bars and clubs and although she could still walk, the appellant volunteered 
to walk with her or escort her back to the ship.123 The military appellate 
court described her recollection of the events that followed and her mental 
state in detail.  IT2 B.S. remembered walking towards her ship and passing 
a café she recognized.124     
 
The next thing IT2 B.S. recalled [was the appellant] engaging in anal sex 
with her. She felt pain and told him to stop, which he did. B.S. then 
became sick, vomiting on the bed, and got up to clean herself off and go to 
the bathroom. As she did this, she recognized the apartment she was in as 
one she had visited prior to that evening. She went to the bathroom and 
turned on the shower to rinse herself off. Her next memory was being on 
the floor of the bathroom naked with [the appellant] banging on the hatch. 
She recalled feeling very cold and sick and returned to the bed to get under 
the covers. She recalled that at some point she got out of bed and went to 
the kitchen to get water. 
 
 120. Id. at 766. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 767. 
 124. Id. 
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IT2 B.S. reported various fragmented memories following the shower. She 
remembered engaging in vaginal sexual intercourse and sexual conduct in 
various positions, including being on top of [IT2 Pease], lying on her side, 
and being on her hands and knees with [IT2 Pease] entering her from 
behind. She reported at one point while she was on top, [IT2 Pease] bit her 
nipple. This caused her pain, so she told him to stop, which he did. She 
also recalled performing fellatio on [IT2 Pease] while he lay on his back. 
 
IT2 B.S. admitted she enjoyed certain portions of the sex, stating, “I recall 
telling [the Naval Criminal Investigative Service] about the doggie style 
and it was vaginal and I — I do recall telling them that I enjoyed it and 
that I — I did for the moment that I — I woke up or, you know, had the 
next memory I did enjoy it for that.” After being asked, “Does that mean it 
felt good?” she responded, “That night, yes, for those moments, yes, after 
the next day, no.”125 
 
The day after the incident involving the appellant and IT2 B.S., ITSN 
S.K. and IT2 B.S. exchanged information about the incidents involving the 
appellant, and decided to report him for sexual assault.126 
At trial, two expert witnesses expounded on “the distinction between 
blackout—memory loss—versus pass out—unconsciousness. The higher a 
person’s BAC, the more likely he will experience blackout.  A person 
experiencing blackout could, however, still be functioning and responsive 
to others; their brain just is not recording memories.”127 Another expert 
witness discussed behavior during an alcohol-related blackout and noted the 
“individual: is still fully conscious. They’re moving around, acting, 
engaging, talking, dancing, driving, engaging in all kinds of behavior, but 
because of alcohol’s inhibition of the transfer of information from short-
term memory to long-term memory,” they are unable to remember the 
events that occurred while intoxicated.128 Dr. Fromme testified that as 
people become intoxicated they may also become reckless . . . or even 
sexually provocative” and when they pass out, on the other hand, at BACs 
of  0.30 or higher individuals loose consciousness “and would not easily be 
roused.”129  
 
 125. Id. at 767-68. 
 126. Id. at 768. 
 127. Id. at 769. 
 128. Id.   
 129. Id.  
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The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reversed IT2 
Pease’s convictions for sexually assaulting ITSN S.K. and IT2 B.S., holding 
that the evidence did not establish the two women “were ‘incapable of 
consenting,’ [IT2 Pease] reasonably may have believed that they were 
willing partners in sexual activity [; and the evidence did not establish] . . . 
that the appellant knew or reasonably should have known that [they were] 
incapable of consenting.”130 
b. United States v. Clark131 2015  
In Clark, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 
the appellant’s convictions for forcible rape and forcible sodomy because 
the court—exercising its factual sufficiency review authority— deemed the 
victim, SW, to lack credibility.132 SW and the appellant engaged in mutual 
kissing on a couch at the appellant’s residence; the victim was too 
intoxicated to drive home; and the appellant and victim went upstairs 
together to spend the night.133 SW initially related “that the next morning 
she awoke in an upstairs room, completely naked and on the floor, next to 
the appellant who was also naked. SW testified that at this point her last 
clear memory was of going upstairs with the appellant.”134 Later, SW 
regained fragmented memories of the sexual activity with the appellant, and 
her descriptions albeit fragmentary, if believed, established the appellant’s 
use of some force.135 The appellant provided inconsistent statements about 




 130. Id. at 771. In United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016), the Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces affirmed the decision of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals 
to set aside some of the appellant’s convictions for lack of factual sufficiency. The Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces concluded that the lower court applied the proper standard of 
review for incapacity, that is, the victim be incompetent due to intoxication, which is lacking “the 
mental or physical ability to consent,” and “incapable of consenting” including “the ability to 
make or to communicate a decision.” Id. At *12-13. 
 131. United States v. Clark, NMCCA 201400232, 2015 CCA LEXIS 287 (N.M. Ct. Crim. 
App. July 14, 2015). 
 132. Id. at *7-8; “The military judge acquitted the appellant of one specification of aggravated 
sexual assault for engaging in a sexual act with a person who was substantially incapacitated. The 
rape and aggravated assault specifications were pled in the alternative.” Id. at *8 n.1. 
 133. Id. at *1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *2. 
 136. Id. at *7-8. 
SCHENCK.FINAL2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2016  4:59 PM 
552 SOUTHWESTERN LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 45 
One expert witness explained that SW’s statement that she recovered 
some fragmentary memories of the sexual activity with the appellant about 
her lack of consent was not possible as memories lost during an “en bloc” 
alcohol-induced blackout cannot be recovered.137 Another expert witness 
indicated SW’s description was consistent with a “fragmentary blackout” 
and confused memories can surface in the days following an episode of 
heavy alcohol consumption.138  
In Clark, the appellant “was convicted of causing SW to engage in 
sexual intercourse ‘by using strength, sufficient that she could not avoid or 
escape the sexual contact’ and committing sodomy with SW ‘by force and 
without [her] consent’ . . . under the version of Article 120, UCMJ, in effect 
from 1 October 2007 to 27 June 2012.”139 The appellate court found SW’s 
description of events that took place upstairs in the appellant’s residence to 
be too incomplete to support the element of force, and the appellant’s 
convictions were not established beyond a reasonable doubt.140  
3. 2014 Cases Addressing the 2012 Article 120’s Absence of a 
Definition of “Incapacitated,” but Affirming Convictions:  United 
States v. Torres141 and United States v Redmon142 
In Torres, the victim, AM, described her substantial alcohol 
consumption and subsequent state of intoxication as follows: 
 
[AM] told her husband she was not feeling well. She staggered down the 
hallway using the walls for support and went into the bathroom. Both 
[AM’s husband] and the appellant saw AM stagger down that hall and into 
the bathroom. She knelt next to the toilet and started “dry heaving.” After 
a few minutes, AM fell asleep in the bathroom at approximately 0130. At 
approximately the same time, [AM’s husband], highly intoxicated himself, 
went outside on the concrete patio to smoke a cigarette. While smoking, 
he was sitting on a table but soon fell asleep on top of the table. The next 
thing AM remembered was waking up in the spare bedroom on the air 
mattress. She had no memory how she got there and was disoriented and 
in discomfort; she then realized that someone was having sexual 
 
 137. Id. at *3-5. 
 138. Id. at *3, *5-6. 
 139. Id. at *7. 
 140. Id. 
 141. United States v. Torres, NMCCA 201300396, 2014 CCA LEXIS 641 (U.S. Navy-Marine 
Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 169 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 
 142. United States v. Redmon, NMCCA 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (N-M. Crim. 
App. June 26, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 77 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 
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intercourse with her. As she started to wake up, she realized that she was 
wearing only a bikini top. The tank top, shorts, and underwear that she had 
worn while asleep in the bathroom had been removed. By the time she 
regained her senses, AM saw the appellant, naked, lying next to her. She 
rolled off the air mattress, grabbed some clothes that were on top of her 
red suitcase, and went to look for her husband. 
 
* *  * 
 
Upset, disoriented, and scared, AM called 911 between 0240 and 0245. 
When speaking with the 911 operator, AM was emotional and was having 
difficulty orienting herself in the house. Having never before been in the 
house, AM did not know the address, but eventually was able to find some 
mail with the house address. While her primary concern was her 
husband’s condition, she told the dispatcher that she had been raped by the 
appellant and that the appellant was still in the house.143  
 
The court “conclude[d] that one who engages in sexual intercourse 
with another who is unconscious due to alcohol intoxication could be 
prosecuted if the individual who initiated the sexual act knew, or should 
have known, that the other person was unconscious.”144 Moreover, these 
facts were sufficient to establish the accused’s guilt of sexual assault 
beyond a reasonable doubt.145  
In United States v. Redmon,146 the court described the victim’s (IT3 S) 
state of intoxication and conduct as follows: 
 
The party ended somewhere around 0300 and IT3 S was intoxicated to the 
extent that she had difficulty walking. The appellant and others helped IT3 
S back to her apartment, a 10-minute walk away. Once in her apartment, 
IT3 S undressed and sat on the floor of the shower with the water running 
over her for approximately 45 minutes.   After [IT3 S’s friend] 
experienced difficulty extracting IT3 S from the shower, the appellant 
assisted him in retrieving her from the shower and helping dress her. 
During the course of dressing her, IT3 S began to vomit in the toilet.   
 
*  *  * 
 
 143. Torres, 2014 CCA LEXIS 641, at *5-7. 
 144. Id. at *25-26. (citing United States v. Vaughan, 58 M.J. 29, 31 (C.A.A.F. 2003)). 
 145. Id. at *16-17. 
 146. Redmon, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369, at *1. 
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IT3 S indicated that after she fell asleep, the next thing she remembers is 
waking up, naked from the waist down, and the appellant on top of her, 
penetrating her vagina with his penis. IT3 S began to cry, pushed appellant 
aside, put on a pair of sweatpants, and went to sleep in her bed.147  
 
IT3 made a timely report of the sexual assault to authorities a few 
hours after the assault.148  Based on a factual foundation provided by 
multiple witnesses, a forensic toxicologist, Colonel Lyons, “stated that he 
would have put [IT3 S’s] blood alcohol content (BAC) [at the time of the 
sexual activity at] between .19 and .22.” 149 The court was satisfied that IT3 
was “substantially incapacitated” when the accused engaged in sexual 
activity with her. 150   
V. COMPARISON TO CIVILIAN CASE LAW 
A. “Incapacitation” in the Federal Sector 
In comparison, federal law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246, sets 
forth the substantive criminal provisions that prohibit various sex offenses.  
Subsection two of 18 U.S.C. 2242, sexual abuse, addresses cases where the 
victim lacks the capacity to consent; that provision provides that an offense 
is committed when the defendant “engages in a sexual act with another 
person if that other person is—(A) incapable of appraising the nature of the 
conduct; or (B) physically incapable of declining participation in, or 
communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.”  Title 18 
U.S.C. § 2246 provides the definitions for Section 2242, and Section 2246 
does not further define the degree of a victim’s incapability. 
Federal circuit courts, however, do not have the authority to review 
district court cases for factual sufficiency.  Rather, these appellate courts 
conduct a legal sufficiency review, defined by the Supreme Court as 
whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.151 Limited federal 
circuit court case law exists that discusses the legal sufficiency of Title 18 
 
 147. Id. at *1-2. 
 148. Id. at *3. 
 149. Id. at *5. 
 150. Id. at *5-6. 
 151. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). 
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sex offense cases regarding the complainant’s incapacity due to alcohol 
consumption.152  
In delineating the level of intoxication at which a person becomes 
substantially incapacitated and, for purposes of the statute, unable to 
consent to sexual acts, some federal courts have upheld findings in 
instances where individuals were “passed out” as well as “blacked out.” The 
Eighth Circuit has established a knowledge requirement, and the 
Government must prove “that the Defendant . . . knew that [the victim] was 
physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.”153   
Nevertheless, in United States v. Marrowbone,154 the Eighth Circuit 
Court upheld a conviction of sexual assault under the federal statute when 
the complaining witness had stated to tribal police that he was “passed out” 
when the accused sexually assaulted him.155 In Marrowbone, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed a conviction of sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2242(2)(B), where the victim testified that he got drunk on alcohol the 
defendant supplied, passed out, and awoke to find the accused engaging in 
anal sex with him.156 The Ninth Circuit Court in United States v. Stamper,157 
upheld the district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal, finding that the 
government had made sufficient showing that the victim was “blacked out” 
during the assault.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed this conviction where the 
victim woke up to find the accused having sex with her, and she did not 
consent to the sexual activity, and the court rejected the accused’s claim of 
consent.158 However, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Peters reversed 
a conviction for sexual abuse because of insufficient evidence that the 
intoxicated victim “was incapable of declining participation in the sexual 
act” even though she drank 12 beers, she passed out, and could not 
 
 152. See Jill M. Marks, Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2242(2), 
Proscribing Sexual Abuse of Person Incapable of Appraising Nature of Conduct, Declining 
Participation, or Communicating Unwillingness to Participate in Sexual Act, 83 A.L.R. Fed. 2d. 
1, §§ 6-7 (2014). 
 153. 3-61 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, ¶ 61.04 (Matthew Bender 
2015) (citing United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also United 
States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 154. 211 F.3d. 452, 454 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 155. Id. at 456; see also United States v. Mariner, No. 4:09–cr–101, 2012 WL 6082720, at *3 
(D.N.D. Dec. 4, 2012) (finding that victim was “passed out” according to accused’s own 
statement). 
 156. Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 454. 
 157. 507 F.App’x. 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 158. United States v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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remember how she got into her bedroom or the sex act by the accused.159 
The victim in Peters did “not remember consenting to have sex with Peters, 
and [she said] that she would never have consented to having sex with 
Peters.”160 The victim’s family found her partially undressed in her bed and 
called the police; the victim was difficult to awaken, and the accused was 
found hiding in the victim’s closet; however, the accused, who was the only 
witness to the sex act, claimed it was consensual.161 
B. “Incapacitation” in the State Sector 
In the state sector, “[t]he prevailing view is that ‘voluntary 
consumption of drugs or alcohol does not, without more, render consent 
involuntary.’”162 Confusion of the victim’s judgment or reduced inhibitions 
through the voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs is insufficient to 
render consent involuntary.163 The victim must be “unable to give a 
knowing and voluntary consent, and—in order to charge defendant with 
criminal responsibility—that the inability to consent was known or apparent 
to the defendant.”164 Typically, states do not recognize the victim’s partial 
or substantial lack of capacity due to the voluntary consumption of alcohol 
or drugs as rendering a victim’s consent involuntary.165  
The “substantially incapacitated or substantially incapable” term in the 
2007 Article 120 was drawn from the state criminal codes of Michigan,166 
 
 159. United States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 160. Id. at 965. 
 161. Id. at 965-66.  
 162. Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citing Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, CRIMINAL LAW 212-13 (3d ed. 1982)).  
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11 (1986), 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 3, 5 (1980); 3 FRANCIS 
WHARTON & CHARLES TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 289 (14th ed. 1980)). 
 165. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West 2014) (defining consent as “intelligent, 
knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission. ‘Consent’ shall not be 
deemed or construed to mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the 
offender.” The term “mentally incapacitated” is defined as “temporarily incapable of appraising or 
controlling a person’s own conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or intoxicating 
substance administered without his or her consent or due to any other act committed upon that 
person without his or her consent.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(c) (West 2014)).  
 166. 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO JSC, supra note 41, at 256-57. The “substantial capacity” 
test was drawn from the Michigan Compiled Laws, which included the following definition, “(h) 
‘Mentally incapacitated’ means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or 
controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or other substance 
administered to that person without his or her consent, or due to any other act committed upon that 
person without his or her consent.” Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520a(h) (2004)). 
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Maine,167 Maryland,168 and Ohio.169 Under the 2007 Article 120 provision, 
the victim could testify that she lacked capacity or was intoxicated to the 
extent where she was incapable of resisting the defendant’s advances or 
consenting to the sexual activity because she was asleep, passed out from 
alcohol, or too impaired to communicate lack of consent.  
Under Ohio law, an accused may be convicted when “[t]he other 
person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a 
mental or physical condition or because of advanced age, and the offender 
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person’s ability to 
resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical 
condition or because of advanced age.”170 An Ohio appellate court 
addressed the situation where a victim was intoxicated but not unconscious 
from alcohol consumption stating as follows: 
 
[T]here can be a fine, fuzzy, and subjective line between intoxication and 
impairment. Every alcohol consumption does not lead to a substantial 
impairment. Additionally, the waters become even murkier when 
reviewing whether a defendant knew, or should have known, that someone 
was impaired rather than merely intoxicated. Of course, there are times 
when it would be apparent to all onlookers that an individual is 
substantially impaired, such as intoxication to the point of 
unconsciousness. On the other hand, “a person who is experiencing [an 
 
 167. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Title 17-A, Maine Criminal Code, Part 2, Ch. 11 § 255-A(1)G and 
A(1)H, unlawful sexual contact which includes “substantially incapable” as follows: 
G. The other person suffers from a mental disability that is reasonably apparent or known to 
the actor that in fact renders the other person substantially incapable of appraising the nature 
of the contact involved or of understanding that the other person has the right to deny or 
withdraw consent. Violation of this paragraph is a Class D crime; 
H. The other person suffers from a mental disability that is reasonably apparent or known to 
the actor that in fact renders the other person substantially incapable of appraising the nature 
of the contact involved or of understanding that the other person has the right to deny or 
withdraw consent and the sexual contact includes penetration. Violation of this paragraph is a 
Class C crime. 
 (emphasis added). 
 168. Id. at 610-11. Maryland Sexual Offenses in Title 3, Subtitle 3, § 3-301(c) provides the 
following definition: 
(c) Mentally incapacitated individual. – “Mentally incapacitated individual” means an 
individual who, because of the influence of a drug, narcotic, or intoxicating substance, or 
because of an act committed on the individual without the individual's consent or awareness, 
is rendered substantially incapable of: 
   (1) appraising the nature of the individual's conduct; or 
   (2) resisting vaginal intercourse, a sexual act, or sexual contact. 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301 (West 2007). This provision is unchanged in the current 
Maryland Criminal Code. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301 (West 2015). 
 169. 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO JSC, supra note 41, at 688-89; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2004). 
 170. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2015) (emphasis added). 
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alcohol induced] blackout may walk, talk, and fully perform ordinary 
functions without others being able to tell that he is ‘blacked out.’”171  
 
Under Ohio case law, a victim who has an alcohol-related blackout 
may nevertheless consent to sexual activity when the impairment is not to a 
sufficient level.172 However, as mentioned earlier, state criminal appellate 
courts do not have the authority to exercise a factual sufficiency review of 
cases.    
VI. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
In addition to modifying the definition of consent to include a 
definition of “substantially incapacitated,” as recommended previously,173 
the criminal provision regarding victim impairment within the aggravated 
sexual assault provision also should be returned to UCMJ, Article 120.  
Unlike the 2012 Article 120, the 2007 version of UCMJ art. 120(t)(14) 
limited the consent defense and an accused could be convicted of a sex 
crime if he or she engaged in a sex act with a victim who was substantially 
incapable of “physically declining participation in the sexual conduct at 
issue; or physically communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual 
conduct at issue.”174 Furthermore, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals 
and the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals found factual 
sufficiency in cases involving the 2007 version of Article 120 in cases 
where the victims were blacked out.175   
 
 171. State v. Doss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449, ¶18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing Peter Westin, Egelhoff Again, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1231). 
 172. See id. at ¶¶ 25, 26 (reversing rape and kidnapping conviction for lack of legal 
sufficiency when victim had no memory of departing bar, going to accused’s residence, and 
having sex with accused because accused may not have known of her degree of impairment and 
noting trial court did not err in failing to expressly define the phrase substantial impairment for the 
jury); see also State v. Rivera, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97091, 2012-Ohio-2060 (May 10, 2012). 
But see State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98151, 2012-Ohio-5737, ¶¶ 29, 34 (Dec. 6, 2012) 
(affirming rape conviction and citing victim’s description of her degree of alcohol-related 
impairment and corroboration by her friend); Ohio v. Jordan, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 06 HA 586, 
2007-Ohio-3333, ¶¶ 29-34 (June 22, 2007) (affirming conviction under OHIO REV. CODE § 
2907.02(A)(1)(c) and noting victim’s statement of degree of alcohol-related impairment was 
corroborated by other witnesses). 
 173. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text describing the recommendation to include 
a definition of “substantially incapacitated” within the definition of consent in the UCMJ; UCMJ, 
supra note 4, § 920 (West 2012). 
 174. UCMJ, supra note 4, § 920(t)(14) (West 2007). 
 175. See United States v. Nicely, ACM 36730, 2007 WL2506432 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 
15, 2007). United States v. Redmon, NMCCA 201300077, 2014 CCA LEXIS 369 (U.S. Navy-
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To further protect victims, that provision, as reflected in the following 
language from the 2007 Article 120(c), offense of aggravated sexual 
assault176 should be imported into Article 120, UCMJ:  
 
Any person . . .who—(2) engages in a sexual act with another person of 
any age, if that other person is substantially incapacitated or substantially 
incapable of—(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act; (B) declining 
participating in the sexual act; or (C) communicating unwillingness to 
engage in the sexual act; is guilty of aggravated sexual assault.177 
 
This 2007 Article 120 provision primarily reflected the Title 18 offense 
of sexual abuse,178 with the addition of the word “substantially,” which was 
added to reduce the possibility that the fact finder might acquit an accused 
based on the belief that the victim might need to be completely incapable of 
appraising the nature of the conduct or communicating unwillingness to 
engage in the sex act.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
UCMJ art. 120(b)(3) that states the accused “commits a sexual act upon 
another person when the other person is incapable of consenting to the 
sexual act due to—(A) impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar 
substance, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by 
the person,” should be amended to reinstate the 2007 version of the statute. 
The 2007 UCMJ art. 120(t)(14) limited the consent defense and did not 
permit the consent defense for an accused who engages in a sex act with a 
victim who is substantially incapable of “physically declining participation 
in the sexual conduct at issue; or physically communicating unwillingness 
to engage in the sexual conduct at issue.” (emphasis added). The decision 
that victims be completely incapable of declining sexual conduct, as 
 
Marine Crim. App. June 26, 2014), pet. denied, 74 M.J. 77 (C.A.A.F. 2014); see also Sameit, 
supra note 8, at 121. 
 176. The 2012 amendment to Article 120 changed the name of the offense and deleted the 
term “aggravated.”    
 177. UCMJ, supra note 4, § 920(c)(2) (West 2007).                 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (West 2007). The Eighth Circuit determined the defense was entitled to 
an instruction that the accused had to know that the victim was “incapable of appraising the nature 
of the conduct; or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating 
unwillingness to engage in” the sex act in order to be found guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2242.  United States v. Rouillard, 740 F.3d 1170, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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opposed to substantially incapable, allows an accused to take advantage of 
victims who are extremely intoxicated but still conscious.    
 
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has described the military 
appellate courts as “something like the proverbial 800-pound gorilla when it 
comes to their ability to protect an accused” under Article 66(c), UCMJ.179  
Military courts of criminal appeals should join the other federal appellate 
courts and only apply the legal sufficiency standard in their review of 
courts-martial convictions. There is no reason for this protective 
anachronism to continue to be used to reverse courts-martial convictions 
when accused service members have essentially all the rights and 
protections as other American citizens, in addition to some rights and 








 179. United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 271 (C.M.A. 1993). 
 180. DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE MODERN AMERICAN MILITARY 246 (Oxford University Press 
2013) (citing R. Chuck Mason, Military Justice: Courts-Martial, an Overview, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41739.pdf; Jack L. 
Rives & Stephen J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice in the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F.L. REV. 213 (2002)). 
  
